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A stabil párosítás probléma gyengén rendezett listákkal és 
korlátozott élekkel 
CSEH ÁGNES – KLAUS HEEGER 
ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ 
A klasszikus stabil párosítás problémában nők és férfiak egy halmaza adott. Mindenki 
felállít egy szigorúan rendezett preferencialistát az ellenkezű nem néhány tagjáról. 
Akkor nevezünk egy párosítást stabilnak, ha azt nem blokkolja egyetlen pár sem. Egy 
pár akkor blokkolja a párosítást, ha mindkét tagja magasabban rangsorolja egymást, 
mint a párosításban hozzájuk rendelt személyeket. Ha a preferencialisták nem 
szigorúan, hanem gyengén rendezettek, akkor háromféle stabilitási definícióval 
dolgozhatunk: gyenge, erős és szuper-stabilitással. Egyes párok lehetnek 
korlátozottak is: a kötelező párokat muszáj, a tiltott párokat pedig tilos tartalmaznia a 
keresett stabil párosításnak. A szabad élek lehetnek párosítás tagjai, de nem 
blokkolhatnak párosítást. 
Cikkünkben bonyolultságelméleti szempontból tanulmányozzuk a stabil megoldás 
létezését mindhárom stabilitási definícióra, mindhárom féle korlátozott él 
jelenlétében. Minden eddig nyitott kérdést megválaszolunk. Az is kiderül, hogy a 
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Abstract
In the stable marriage problem, a set of men and a set of women are given,
each of whom has a strictly ordered preference list over the acceptable agents
in the opposite class. A matching is called stable if it is not blocked by any
pair of agents, who mutually prefer each other to their respective partner.
Ties in the preferences allow for three different definitions for a stable match-
ing: weak, strong and super-stability. Besides this, acceptable pairs in the
instance can be restricted in their ability of blocking a matching or being
part of it, which again generates three categories of restrictions on accept-
able pairs. Forced pairs must be in a stable matching, forbidden pairs must
not appear in it, and lastly, free pairs cannot block any matching.
Our computational complexity study targets the existence of a stable
solution for each of the three stability definitions, in the presence of each of
the three types of restricted pairs. We solve all cases that were still open. As
a byproduct, we also derive that the maximum size weakly stable matching
problem is hard even in very dense graphs, which may be of independent
interest.
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1. Introduction1
In the classical stable marriage problem (sm) [14], a bipartite graph is2
given, where one side symbolizes a set of men U , while the other side sym-3
bolizes a set of women W . Man u and woman w are connected by the edge uw4
if they find one another mutually acceptable. In the most basic setting, each5
participant provides a strictly ordered preference list of the acceptable agents6
of the opposite gender. An edge uw blocks matching M if it is not in M , but7
each of u and w is either unmatched or prefers the other to their respective8
partner in M . A stable matching is a matching not blocked by any edge.9
From the seminal paper of Gale and Shapley [14], we know that the exis-10
tence of such a stable solution is guaranteed and a stable matching can be11
found in linear time.12
Several real-world applications [6] require a relaxation of the strict or-13
der to weak order, or, in other words, preference lists with ties, leading to14
the stable marriage problem with ties (smt) [16, 18, 24]. When ties occur,15
the definition of a blocking edge needs to be revisited. In the literature,16
three intuitive definitions are used, namely weakly, strongly and super-stable17
matchings [16]. According to weak stability, a matching is weakly blocked18
by an edge uw if agents u and w both strictly prefer one another to their19
partners in the matching. A strongly blocking edge is preferred strictly by20
one end vertex, whereas it is not strictly worse than the matching edge at the21
other end vertex. A super-blocking edge is at least as good as the matching22
edge for both end vertices in the super-stable case. Super-stable matchings23
are strongly stable and strongly stable matchings are weakly stable by def-24
inition, because weakly blocking edges are strongly blocking, and strongly25
blocking edges are super-blocking at the same time.26
Weak and strong stability serve as the goal to achieve in most applica-27
tions, such as college admission programs. In most countries, colleges are not28
required to rank all applicants in a strict order of preference, hence large ties29
occur in their lists. According to the equal treatment policy used in Chile30
and Hungary for example, it may not occur that a student is rejected from a31
college preferred by her, even though other students with the same score are32
admitted [7, 29]. Other countries, such as Ireland [9], break ties with lottery,33
which gives way to a weakly stable solution according to the original, weak34
order. Super-stable matchings can represent safe solutions if agents provide35
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uw must be in M uw can be in M uw must not be in M
uw can block M forced unrestricted forbidden
uw cannot block M forced free irrelevant
Table 1: The three types of restricted edges are marked with bold letters. The columns
tells edge uw’s role regarding being in a matching, while the rows split cases based on
uw’s ability to block a matching.
uncertain preferences that mask an underlying strict order [30, 5, 4]. If two36
edges are in the same tie because of incomplete information derived from the37
agent, then super-stable matchings form the set of matchings that guarantee38
stability for all possible true preferences.39
Another classical direction of research is to distinguish some of the edges40
based on their ability to be part of or to block a matching. Table 1 provides41
a structured overview of the three sorts of restricted edges that have been42
defined in earlier papers [20, 11, 12, 3, 22, 10]. The mechanism designer can43
specify three sets of restricted edges: forced edges must be in the output44
matching, forbidden edges must not appear in it, and finally, free edges45
cannot block the matching, regardless of the preference ordering.46
The market designer’s motivation behind forced and forbidden edges is47
clear. By adding these restricted edges to the instance, one can shrink the48
set of stable solutions to the matchings that contain a particularly important49
or avoid an unwelcome partnership between agents. Free edges model a less50
intuitive, yet ubiquitous scenario in applications [3]. Agents are often not51
aware of the preferences of others, not even once the matching has been52
specified. This typically occurs in very large markets, such as job markets [2],53
or if the preferences are calculated rather than just provided by the agents,54
such as in medical [8] and social markets [1]. Agents who cannot exchange55
their preferences are connected via a free edge. If a matching is only blocked56
by free edges, then no pair of agents can undermine the stability of it.57
In this paper, we combine weakly ordered lists and restricted edges, and58
determine the computational complexity of finding a stable matching in all59
cases not solved yet.60
1.1. Literature review61
We first focus on the known results for the smt problem without restricted62
edges, and then switch to the sm problem with edge restrictions. Finally, we63
list all progress up to our paper in smt with restricted edges.64
3
Ties. If all edges are unrestricted, a weakly stable matching always exists,65
because generating any linear extension to each preference list results in a66
classical sm instance, which admits a solution [14]. This solution remains67
stable in the original instance as well. On the other hand, strong and super-68
stable matchings are not guaranteed to exist. However, there are polynomial-69
time algorithms to output a strongly/super-stable matching or a proof for70
its nonexistence [16, 25].71
Restricted edges. Dias et al. [11] showed that the problem of finding a stable72
matching in a sm instance with forced and forbidden edges or reporting that73
none exists is solvable in O(m) time, where m is the number of edges in74
the instance. Approximation algorithms for instances not admitting any75
stable matching including all forced and avoiding all forbidden edges were76
studied in [10]. The existence of free edges can only enlarge the set of stable77
solutions, thus a stable matching with free edges always exists. However, in78
the presence of free edges, a maximum-cardinality stable matching is NP-79
hard to find [3]. Kwanashie [22, Sections 4 and 5] performed an exhaustive80
study on various stable matching problems with free edges. The term “stable81
with free edges” [8, 13] is equivalent to the adjective “socially stable” [3, 22]82
for a matching.83
Ties and restricted edges. Table 2 illustrates the known and our new re-84
sults on problems that arise when ties and restricted edges are combined85
in an instance. Weakly stable matchings in the presence of forbidden edges86
were studied by Scott [32], where the author shows that deciding whether a87
matching exists avoiding the set of forbidden edges is NP-complete. A simi-88
lar hardness result was derived by Manlove et al. [26] for the case of forced89
edges, even if the instance has a single forced edge. Forced and forbidden90
edges in super-stable matchings were studied by Fleiner et al. [12], who gave a91
polynomial-time algorithm to decide whether a stable solution exists. Strong92
stability in the presence of forced and forbidden edges is covered by Kun-93
ysz [21], who gave a polynomial-time algorithm for the weighted strongly94
stable matching problem with non-negative edge weights. Since strongly sta-95
ble matchings are always of the same cardinality [23, 18], a stable solution96
or a proof for its nonexistence can be found via setting the edge weights to97
0 for forbidden edges, 2 for forced edges, and 1 for unrestricted edges.98
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Existence weak strong super
forbidden NP-complete [32] even if |P | = 1 O(nm) [21] O(m) [12]
forced NP-complete even if |Q| = 1 [26] O(nm) [21] O(m) [12]
free always exists NP-complete NP-complete
Table 2: Previous and our results summarized in a table. The contribution of this paper
is marked by bold gray font. The instance has n vertices, m edges, |P | forbidden edges,
and |Q| forced edges.
1.2. Our contributions99
In Section 3 we prove a stronger result than the hardness proof in [32]100
delivers: we show that finding a weakly stable matching in the presence of101
forbidden edges is NP-complete even if the instance has a single forbidden102
edge.103
As a byproduct, we gain insight into the well-known maximum size weakly104
stable matching problem (without any edge restriction). This problem is105
known to be NP-complete [19, 26], even if preference lists are of length at most106
three [17, 27]. On the other hand, if the graph is complete, a complete weakly107
stable matching is guaranteed to exist. It turns out that this completeness108
is absolutely crucial to keep the problem tractable: as we show here, if the109
graph is a complete bipartite graph missing exactly one edge, then deciding110
whether a perfect weakly stable matching exists is NP-complete.111
We turn to the problem of free edges under strong and super-stability in112
Section 4. We show that deciding whether a strongly/super-stable matching113
exists when free edges occur in the instance is NP-complete. This hard-114
ness is in sharp contrast to the polynomial-time algorithms for the weighted115
strongly/ super-stable matching problems. Afterwards, we show that decid-116
ing the existence of a strongly or super-stable matching in an instance with117
free edges is fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by the number of free118
edges.119
2. Preliminaries120
The input of the stable marriage problem with ties consists of a bipartite121
graph G = (U ∪W,E) and for each v ∈ U ∪W , a weakly ordered preference122
list Ov of the edges incident to v. We denote the number of vertices in G123
by n, while m stands for the number of edges. An edge connecting vertices u124
and w is denoted by uw. We say that the preference lists in an instance are125
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derived from a master list if there is a weak order O of U∪W so that each Ov126
where v ∈ U ∪W can be obtained by deleting entries from O.127
The set of restricted edges consists of the set of forbidden edges P , the set128
of forced edges Q, and the set of free edges F . These three sets are disjoint.129
Definition 1. A matching M is weakly/strongly/super-stable with restricted130
edge sets P,Q, and F , if M∩P = ∅, Q ⊆M , and the set of edges blocking M131
in a weakly/strongly/super sense is a subset of F .132
3. Weak stability133
In Theorem 1 we present a hardness proof for the weakly stable matching134
problem with a single forbidden edge, even if this edge is ranked last by135
both end vertices. The hardness of the maximum-cardinality weakly stable136
matching problem in dense graphs (Theorem 2) follows easily from this result.137
Problem 1. smt-forbidden-1138
Input: A complete bipartite graph G = (U∪W,E), a forbidden edge P = {uw}139
and preference lists with ties.140
Question: Does there exist a weakly stable matching M so that uw /∈M?141
Theorem 1. smt-forbidden-1 is NP-complete, even if all ties are of length142
two, they appear only on one side of the bipartition and at the beginning of143
the complete preference lists, and the forbidden edge is ranked last by both its144
end vertices.145
Proof. smt-forbidden-1 is clearly in NP, as any matching can be checked146
for weak stability in linear time.147
We reduce from the perfect-smti problem defined below, which is148
known to be NP-complete even if all ties are of length two, and appear on149
one side of the bipartition and at the beginning of the preference lists, as150
shown by Manlove et al. [26].151
Problem 2. perfect-smti152
Input: An incomplete bipartite graph G = (U ∪W,E), and preference lists153
with ties.154
Question: Does there exist a perfect weakly stable matching M?155
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Construction. To each instance I of perfect-smti, we construct an in-156
stance I ′ of smt-forbidden-1.157
Let G = (U ∪W,E) be the underlying graph in instance I. When con-158
structing G′ for I ′, we add two men u1 and u2 to U , and two women w1159
and w2 to W . On vertex classes U
′ = U ∪ {u1, u2} and W ′ = W ∪ {w1, w2},160
G′ will be a complete bipartite graph. As the list below shows, we start with161
the original edge set E(G) in stage 0, and then add the remaining edges in162
four further stages. An example for the built graph is shown in Figure 1.163
0. E(G)164
We keep the edges in E(G) and also preserve the vertices’ rankings on165
them. These edges are solid black in Figure 1.166
1. (U × {w1}) ∪ ({u1} ×W )167
We first connect u1 to all women in W , and w1 to all men in U . Man u1168
(woman w1) ranks the women from W (men from U) in an arbitrary169
order. Each u ∈ U (w ∈ W ) ranks w1 (u1) after all their edges in E(G).170
These edges are loosely dashed green in Figure 1.171
2. (U ×W ) \ E(G)172
Now we add for each pair (u,w) ∈ U×W with uw /∈ E(G) the edge uw,173
where u (w) ranks w (u) even after w1 (u1). These edges are densely174
dashed blue in Figure 1.175
3.
[




{u2} × (W ∪ {w1})
]
176
Man u2 is connected to all women from W ∪ {w1}, and ranks all these177
women in an arbitrary order. The women from W ∪ {w1} rank u2178
worse than any already added edge. Similarly, w2 is connected to all179
men from M ∪ {u1}, and ranks all these men in an arbitrary order.180
The men from M ∪ {u1} rank w2 worse than any already added edge.181
These edges are dotted red in Figure 1.182
4. u1w1 and u2w2183
Finally, we add the edges u1w1 and u2w2, which are ranked last by both184
of their end vertices. Edge u2w2 is the only forbidden edge and it is185
the violet zigzag edge in Figure 1, while u2w2 is wavy gray.186
Claim: I admits a perfect weakly stable matching if and only if I ′ admits187




0. E(G) 1. (U × {w1}) ∪ ({u1} ×W ) 2. (U ×W ) \ E(G)
3.
[




{u2} × (W ∪ {w1})
] 4. {u1, w1} 4. {u2, w2} (forbidden)
Figure 1: An example for the reduction. The legend below the graph lists the six groups of
edges in the preference order at all vertices. The edges from the perfect-smti instance
(drawn in solid black) keep their ranks. Every vertex ranks solid black edges best, then
loosely dashed green edges, then densely dashed blue edges, then dotted red edges, then
the wavy gray edge {u1, w1} and the forbidden violet zigzag edge {uw, w2}.
(⇒) Let M be a perfect weakly stable matching in I. We construct M ′ as189
M∪{u1w2}∪{u2w1}. Clearly, M ′ is a matching not containing the forbidden190
edge u2w2, so it only remains to show that M
′ is weakly stable. We do this191
by case distinction on a possible weakly blocking edge.192
0. E(G)193
Since M does not admit a weakly blocking edge in I, no edge from the194
original E(G) can block M ′ weakly in I ′.195
1. (U × {w1}) ∪ ({u1} ×W )196
All vertices in U ∪W rank these edges lower than their edges in M ′.197
2. (U ×W ) \ E(G)198
Edges in this set cannot block M ′ weakly because they are ranked worse199








(W ∪ {w1})× {u2}
]
201
Vertices in U ∪W prefer their edge in M ′ to all edges in this set. Since202
they are in M ′, u1w2 and u2w1 also cannot block M
′ weakly.203
4. u1w1 and u2w2204
These two edges are strictly worse than u1w2 ∈ M ′ and u2w1 ∈ M ′ at205
all four end vertices.206
(⇐) Let M ′ be a weakly stable matching in I ′ and u2w2 /∈M ′. Since G′207
is a complete bipartite graph with the same number of vertices on both208
sides, M ′ is a perfect matching. In particular, u2 and w2 are matched209
by M ′, say to w and u, respectively. Since M ′ does not contain the for-210
bidden edge u2w2, we have that u 6= u2 and w 6= w2. Then we have w = w1211
and u = u1, as uw blocks M
′ weakly otherwise.212
If M ′ contains an edge uw /∈ E(G) with u ∈ U and w ∈ W , then this213
implies that uw1 is a weakly blocking edge. Thus, M := M
′ \{u1w2, u2w1} ⊆214
E(G), i.e. it is a perfect matching in G. This M is also weakly stable, as any215
weakly blocking edge in G immediately implies a weakly blocking edge for M ′,216
which contradicts our assumption on M ′ being a weakly stable matching.217
As a byproduct, we get that max-smti-dense, the problem of deciding218
whether an almost complete bipartite graph admits a perfect weakly stable219
matching, is also NP-complete.220
Problem 3. max-smti-dense221
Input: A bipartite graph G = (U ∪W,E), where E(G) = {uw : u ∈ U,w ∈222
W} \ {u∗w∗} for some u∗ ∈ U and w∗ ∈ W , and preference lists with ties.223
Question: Does there exist a perfect weakly stable matching M?224
Theorem 2. max-smti-dense is NP-complete, even if all ties are of length225
two, are on one side of the bipartition, and appear at the beginning of the226
preference lists.227
Proof. max-smti-dense is in NP, as a matching can be checked for stability228
in linear time.229
We reduce from smt-forbidden-1. By Theorem 1, this problem is NP-230
complete even if the forbidden edge uw is at the end of the preference lists231
of u and w. For each such instance I of smt-forbidden-1, we construct an232
instance I ′ of max-smti-dense by deleting the forbidden edge uw.233
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Claim: The instance I admits a weakly stable matching if and only if I ′234
admits a perfect weakly stable matching.235
(⇒) Let M be a weakly stable matching for I. As smt-forbidden-1 gets236
a complete bipartite graph as an input, M is a perfect matching. Since M237
does not contain the edge uw, it is also a matching in I ′. Moreover, M238
is weakly stable there, because the transformation only removed a possible239
blocking edge and added none of these.240
(⇐) Let M ′ be a perfect weakly stable matching in I ′. Since uw is at the241
end of the preference lists of u and w, and M ′ is perfect, uw cannot block M ′.242
Thus, M ′ is weakly stable in I.243
Having shown a hardness result for the existence of a weakly stable match-244
ing even in very restricted instances with a single forbidden edge in Theo-245
rem 1, we now turn our attention to strongly and super-stable matchings.246
4. Strong and super-stability247
As already mentioned in Section 1.1, strongly and super-stable matchings248
can be found in polynomial time even if both forced and forbidden edges249
occur in the instance [12, 21]. Thus we consider the case of free edges, and250
in Theorem 3 and Proposition 4 we show hardness for the strong and super-251
stable matching problems in instances with free edges. The same construction252
suits both cases. Then, in Proposition 5 we remark that both problems are253
fixed-parameter tractable with the number of free edges |F | as the parameter.254
Problem 4. ssmti-free255
Input: A bipartite graph G = (U ∪W,E), a set F ⊆ E of free edges, and256
preference lists with ties.257
Question: Does there exist a matching M so that uw ∈ F for all uw ∈ E that258
blocks M in the strongly/super-stable sense?259
In ssmti-free, we define two problem variants simultaneously, because260
all our upcoming proofs are identical for both of these problems. For the261
super-stable marriage problem with ties and free edges, all super-blocking262
edges must be in F , while for the strongly stable marriage problem with ties263
and free edges, it is sufficient if a subset of these, the strongly blocking edges,264
are in F .265
Theorem 3. ssmti-free is NP-complete even in graphs with maximum de-266



















Figure 2: An example of a clause gadget for the clause Ci, containing the variables x1, x4,
and x5. The interconnecting edges are dashed and gray.
Proof. ssmti-free is clearly in NP because the set of edges blocking a match-268
ing can be determined in linear time.269
We reduce from the 1-in-3 positive 3-sat problem, defined below,270
which is known to be NP-complete [31, 15, 28].271
Problem 5. 1-in-3 positive 3-sat272
Input: A 3-SAT formula, in which no literal is negated and every variable273
occurs in at most three clauses.274
Question: Does there exist a satisfying truth assignment that sets exactly one275
literal in each clause to be true?276
Construction. To each instance I of 1-in-3 positive 3-sat, we construct277
an instance I ′ of ssmti-free.278
Let x1, . . . , xn be the variables and C1, . . . , Cm be the clauses of the 1-279
in-3 positive 3-sat instance I. For each clause Ci, we add a clause gadget280
consisting of three vertices ai, bi, and ci, where bi is connected to ai and ci, as281
shown in Figure 2. While vertices ai and bi do not have any further edge, ci282
will be incident to three interconnecting edges leading to variable gadgets.283
Vertex bi is ranked first by ai and last by ci, and these two vertices are placed284
in a tie by bi.285
For each variable xi, occurring in the three clauses Ci1 , Ci2 , and Ci3 , we286
add a variable gadget with nine vertices yji , z
j
i , and w
j
i for j ∈ [3], as indicated287
in Figure 3. Each vertex zji is connected only to y
j










































Figure 3: An example of a variable gadget for the variable xi occurring, where xi oc-
curs exactly in the clauses C1, C3, and C5. Free edges are marked by wavy lines, while
interconnecting edges are dashed and gray.
are the only free edges in our construction. For each (`, j) ∈ [3]2, we add an289
edge w`iy
j
i , which is ranked second (after z
j
i ) by y
j
i . The vertex w
`
i ranks this290
edge at position one if ` = j and else at position two. Finally, we connect291
the vertex w`i to the vertex ci` by an interconnecting edge, ranked at position292
one by ci` and position three by w
`
i .293
The resulting instance is bipartite: U = {zji , w
j
i , bi} is the set of men and294
W = {yji , ci, ai} is the set of women. One easily sees that the maximum295
degree in our reduction is four.296
Note that the preference lists of the women in the ssmti-free instance297
are derived from a master list. The master list for the women W = {yji , ci, ai}298
is the following. At the top are all vertices of the form {zji } in a single tie,299
followed by all vertices of the form {wji } in a single tie, and finally, all other300
vertices {bi} at the bottom of the preference list, in a single tie.301
Claim: I is a YES-instance if and only if I ′ admits a strongly/super-302
stable matching.303
(⇒) Let T be a satisfying truth assignment such that for each clause,304
exactly one literal is true. For each true variable xi in this assignment, let M305
12




i for each ` ∈ [3]. For all other variables,306
let M contain w`iy
`
i for each ` ∈ [3]. For each clause Ci, add the edge aibi307
to M .308
Following these rules, we have constructed a matching. It remains to309
check that M is super-stable (and thus also strongly stable). Since ai is310
matched to its only neighbor, it cannot be part of a super-blocking edge.311
Since each ci is matched along an interconnecting edge, which is better312
than bi, no super-blocking edge involves bi. A super-blocking interconnect-313
ing edge ciw
`
j implies that w
`
j is not matched to any y
`
j, however this is only314
true if ciw
`
j ∈ M . A super-blocking edge w`iy
j
i does not appear. Either w
`
i315
is matched to its unique first choice y`i and therefore not part of a super-316
blocking edge, or yji is matched to its unique first choice z
j
i , and thus, y
j
i is317
not part of a super-blocking edge.318
(⇐) Let M be a strongly stable matching (note that any super-stable319
matching is also strongly-stable). Then M contains the edge aibi, and ci is320
matched to a vertex w`j for all i ∈ [m], as else cibi or aibi blocks M strongly.321
If w`jci ∈ M , then yaj zaj ∈ M for all a ∈ [3], as else w`jyaj would be a strongly322
blocking edge. This, however, implies that waj cja ∈ M for all a ∈ [3], as323
else waj cja would be a strongly blocking edge.324
Thus, for each variable xi, the matching M contains either all edges w
`
ici`325
for ` ∈ [3] or none of these edges. Thus, the variables xi such that M326
contains w`ici` for ` ∈ [3] induce a truth assignment such that for each clause,327
exactly one literal is true.328
This proof aimed at the hardness of the restricted case, in which the329
underlying graph has a low maximum degree. For the sake of completeness,330
we add another variant, which is defined in a complete bipartite graph.331
Proposition 4. ssmti-free is NP-complete, even in complete bipartite graphs,332
where each tie has length at most three.333
Proof. We reduce from ssmti-free. Given a ssmti-free instance in graph334
G, we add all non-present edges between men and women as free edges,335
ranked worse than any edge from E(G). We call the resulting graph H.336
Clearly, a strongly/super-stable matching in G is also strongly/super-337
stable in H, as we only added free edges.338
Vice versa, let M be a strongly/super-stable matching in H. Let M ′ :=339
M ∩E(G) arise from M by deleting all edges not in E(G). Then M ′ clearly340
is a matching in G, so it remains to show that M ′ is strongly/super-stable.341
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Assume that there is a blocking edge uw in G, in the strongly/super-342
stable sense. Since uw is not blocking in H, at least one of u and w has to343
be matched in H, but not in G. However, this vertex prefers uw also to its344
partner in H, and thus, uw is also blocking in H, which is a contradiction.345
Note that ssmti-free becomes polynomial-time solvable if only a con-346
stant number of edges is free in the same way as max-ssmi, the problem347
of finding a maximum-cardinality stable matching with strict lists and free348
edges [3].349
Proposition 5. ssmti-free can be solved in O(2knm) time in the strongly350
stable case, and in O(2km) time in the super-stable case, where k := |F | is the351
number of free edges, n := |V (G)| is the number of vertices, and m := |E(G)|352
is the number of edges.353
Proof. For each subset Q ⊆ F of free edges, we construct an instance of354
ssmti-forced as follows. Mark all edges in Q as forced, and delete all edges355
in F \Q.356
If any of the ssmti-forced instances admits a stable matching, then357
this is clearly a stable matching in the ssmti-free instance, as only free358
edges were deleted. Vice versa, any solution M for the ssmti-free instance359
containing exactly the set of forced edges Q (i.e. Q = M ∩ F ) immediately360
implies a solution for the ssmti-forced instance with forced edges Q.361
Clearly, there are 2k subsets of F . Since any instance of ssmti-forced362
can be solved in O(nm) time in the strongly stable case [12] and in O(m)363
time in the super-stable case [21], the running time follows.364
5. Conclusion365
Studying the stable marriage problem with ties combined with restricted366
edges, we have shown three NP-completeness results. Our computational367
hardness results naturally lead to the question whether imposing master368
lists on both sides makes the problems easier to solve. Moreover, it is open369
whether smt-forbidden-1 remains hard in bounded-degree graphs. In ad-370
dition, one may try to identify relevant parameters for our problems and then371
decide whether they are fixed-parameter tractable or admit a polynomial-372
sized kernel with respect to these parameters.373
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